ECC Software Library IP

 

The ECC Software Library IP is a library of embedded software that performs various Elliptic Curves Cryptography functions. The cryptographic functions peformed by the ECC Software Library include public-key encryption and decryption (Elliptic Curve ElGamal), digital signature generation and verification (ECDSA) and key-establishment protocol (EC Diffie-Hellman)

 

The library embeds high-end counter measures against side-channel attacks.

 

The library is optimized for maximum performances and minimum code and stack size on SPARC LEON2  processors and ARM CORTEX M3 processors with key sizes ranging from 160 bit to 512 bit. . It is delivered as a binary or in assembly source code. It is structured as independent API modules


The ECC Software Library IP can run in stand-alone mode and can also run in conjunction with INVIA's Modular Exponentiation IP that provides hardware acceleration of  cryptographic calculations. It is recommanded to use the Modular Exponentiation IP with processors that do not have a 32x32 multiplier.

 

In stand-alone mode with ARM CORTEX M3 running at 100 MHz, the ECC Software Library delivers 11 ECC 256-bit operations per second. 

 

What's coolHighlights

 

  • Optmized for  SPARC V8 and ARM CORTEX M3
  • ECC-256 bit completed in 86ms on ARM Cortex M3 at 100 MHz in stand-alone mode
  • Code size :16kB on ARM Cortex M3.
  • Memory utilization : 4kB for 256-bit key on ARM Cortex M3


 

 

Security featuresSecurity


  • Resist the most advanced techniques of side-channel analysis
  • Processing atomicity, data whitening, randomization(*) against side-channel attacks

 

DeliverablesDeliverables

 

  • Binaries or Assembly source code for ECC functions
  • Binaries or Assembly source code for low-level API leaf functions
  • C source code examples of use of the libraries

 

(*) : third party IP may apply - please contact us for more information.

Optimized for ARM Cortex M3

 

Did you know ?

 

Side-channel attacks are a dreadful threat to hardware security because they do not require costly equipment and yet yield very good results for attackers.

 

The most popular side-channel attacks are based on statistical analysis of power traces, either by measuring the device's power consumpion using a oscilloscope or by measuring the device's electro-magnetic field. The equipment cost for such attacks is less than few thousands of dolalrs.

 

Another very popular side-channel attack is based on measuring how much time calculations take to perform.

 

Power analysis attacks against cryptosystems were first introduced in 1998.